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Conflicting knowledge 
Why is joint knowledge production such  
a problem? 
Arwin van Buuren and Jurian Edelenbos 
Analysing knowledge use in policy processes 
around contested topics requires a new research 
approach. Traditional research on knowledge for 
policy assumes a one-to-one relationship (which 
is often imperfect) between science and policy as 
two separate worlds. Science, technology and 
society studies teach us that knowledge for policy 
is a joint construct of the research and the policy 
community and is not produced in isolated 
worlds. This article argues that the main problem 
for knowledge use lies in the subdivision between 
different competing ‘knowledge coalitions’ of 
researchers and policy-makers. Conflicting 
knowledge is the result. 
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ODAY THERE ARE a number of fundamental 
insecurities in the knowledge acquisition pro-
cess. Three changes in current society can be 
distinguished that have consequences for acquiring 
knowledge (Gallopín et al, 2001). First, changes of an 
ontological nature can be perceived in the increasing 
complexity and interdependence of the world around 
us (Castells, 2000). Interventions cause a ‘response 
chain’ that is very difficult to survey. 
Uncertainty is a basic feature of information gath-
ering and knowledge production, because reality is 
impossible to depict. The time-honoured strategy 
that was always followed in the past to make  
phenomena more transparent, by reducing the units 
perceived, has proved inadequate. The failure to take 
all sorts of related phenomena, cross-connections, 
and so on, into account trivialises the explanatory 
and predictive value of models (Haag and Kaupen-
johann, 2001). 
Second, there are changes of an epistemological 
nature that refer to the way we arrive at knowledge. 
Each knowledge-generating institute has its own 
epistemological value system. The values constituting 
this paradigm include those about serving the client 
(the user of knowledge), maintaining credibility in 
the academic community, maintaining the image of 
independence, and getting follow-up orders. 
Also the values of research institutes are more fun-
damental: questions about, for instance, how to reach 
valid information, and how to reach usable recom-
mendations (Shackley et al, 1998; in’t Veld and Ver-
heij, 2000). Moreover, it is recognised that knowledge 
is produced collaboratively. Knowledge production 
involves the participation of laymen and needs atten-
tion to be focused on the use of different sources  
of, and perspectives on, knowledge. Scientific  
T
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knowledge should be developed in interaction to 
achieve an effective problem-solving capacity 
(Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). 
Third, the method of decision-making has been 
subject to changes. The traditional institutions of 
state and market, as epicentres of decision-making, 
have lost their importance (Kickert et al, 1997).  
Decision-making has become a social issue, and  
the mobilisation of knowledge has increased tre-
mendously: knowledge has been de-monopolised 
and democratised. Knowledge is no longer the sole 
province of society’s élites, because nowadays 
nearly everyone has received at least some form of 
(higher) education. Knowledge has become public 
property. 
Furthermore, it has become easy for citizens to 
obtain information from various media channels and 
to form their own perspective. The increased amount 
of knowledge present in society enables more people 
to put the aura and superiority of scientific knowl-
edge in perspective by asking clever questions, to 
criticise and debunk this knowledge. 
“Although we must begin any inquiry with pre-
judgements and can never call everything into 
question at once, nevertheless there is no belief 
or thesis, no matter how fundamental, that is 
not open to further interpretation and criti-
cism.” (Bernstein, 1991, page 327) 
The rise of knowledge fights 
The non-recognition of uncertain knowledge as a fact 
of life can lead to certain problems in the production 
of knowledge for policy-making. In practice we see 
that it is very difficult to produce knowledge that is 
acceptable for most parties involved (Lindblom and 
Cohen, 1979; van Bueren et al, 2003). In complex 
processes, actors spend most of their time decon-
structing each other’s research, trying to prove that 
suppositions are contestable, a database inadequate 
and so on. This leads to ‘knowledge fights’, with 
piles of reports as a result, in which contradictory 
conclusions are presented. This greatly hampers the 
quest for well-negotiated and shared knowledge as a 
basis for policy-making. 
In this article, we take a closer look at the origins 
of ‘knowledge conflicts’ in complex policy-making 
processes. In the next section we argue that the main 
problem in the production and transfer of knowledge 
lies not so much in the division between a scientific 
world and a policy world as traditionally is argued, 
but more in a departmentalisation of different 
knowledge coalitions that consists of both knowl-
edge providers (scientists, advisors and so on) and 
users (such as policy-makers). We then use the case 
study of the Betuweline to make this statement plau-
sible. We revisit the knowledge production problem 
in the following section and design a framework  
for further analysis. We conclude by briefly going 
into boundary management strategies to cope with 
the departmentalisation problem of knowledge  
production. 
Knowledge as a product of interaction 
Contextualised knowledge 
Knowledge production is very complicated when we 
take into account that policy processes have to deal 
with many participants — not only policy-makers 
but also private companies and societal groups — 
with conflicting opinions about the desired course  
of action (Teisman, 1995; Edelenbos et al, 2002). 
Environmental groups, private companies, and  
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) try to in-
fluence the policy process and therefore mobilise 
different resources. One of these resources is knowl-
edge (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 1999; van Eeten, 
1999). 
The mobilisation of knowledge is usually not 
very difficult for these actors. There are many  
research institutes, experts, advisors and academic 
departments that could produce facts and figures. 
Experts can often provide specific kinds of knowl-
edge on request. The naïve vision of neutral advisory 
bodies “speaking truth to power” should be re-
nounced (Jasanoff, 1990). The expert mediates be-
tween ‘outside’ scientific knowledge and the 
practical knowledge that he or she acquires by being 
‘within’ the policy process, part and parcel of its 
formulation and implementation (Kazancigil, 1998, 
page 74). 
Scientific knowledge has become increasingly 
contextualised; a necessary development if it wishes 
to retain its relevance in a changing society 
(Nowotny et al, 2002). Knowledge production is 
essentially plural and contextual, and its outcomes 
will be contextual and, generally, multiple: in  
that respect, this approach shares pledges for  
Arwin van Buuren is a PhD student at the department of
Public Administration of Erasmus University in Rotterdam
(The Netherlands). His PhD research is about knowledge
management of complex policy processes. The goal of this
project is to come to an empirical understanding of public
knowledge management. His research interests are espe-
cially transition trajectories in integral water management
and the application of complexity (or chaos) theory in the
study of policy processes.  
 
Dr Jurian Edelenbos is assistant professor at the depart-
ment of Public Administration of Erasmus University in Rot-
terdam. His fields of research and teaching areas are
governance, complex decision-making, network analysis,
public–private partnerships, process management, trust (in
inter-organisational co-operation), transition management,
joint knowledge production, institutional innovation, urban
planning, water management and infrastructure. He has
had articles published in journals such as Public Manage-
ment Review, Evaluation, International Journal for Technol-
ogy, and Policy and Management, and one is due in 2004 in 
Public Administration. 
Why is joint knowledge production such a problem? 
Science and Public Policy August 2004  291 
moving from uniformity and objective knowledge 
towards diversity and contextual knowledge (Hoppe, 
1999; Teisman and Edelenbos, 2002). Society is  
increasingly capable of confronting scientists with 
questions and criticism. Nowotny et al (2002, page 
166) advocate a contextualised form of scientific 
research: interaction with interested parties as being 
crucial to produce the type of science that benefits 
society. 
“The increasing emphasis on the contribution 
of science to wealth creation (and social im-
provement), the growing deference to so-called 
‘user’ perspectives, the great weight now  
attached to ethical and environmental consid-
erations, are all examples of the intensification 
of what we call contextualization.” 
Traditional utilisation research studies the way in 
which knowledge is used in policy processes (Weiss, 
1977; Caplan, 1979; Huberman, 1994). The main 
results of these studies can be summarised briefly by 
saying that the use of knowledge in policy processes 
is often not very impressive and can be characterised 
in different ways, for example, strategic use, instru-
mental use, and enlightenment. Many factors are 
important for the utilisation and impact of informa-
tion (for instance, the presentation of it, the timing, 
and the (dis-)similarities with policy-makers’  
beliefs). 
Although these studies pay a lot of attention to the 
influence of the formulation of the research question 
by the funding agency, and the impact of the inter-
ventions in the research process by this actor, they 
underestimate the importance of the processes by 
which knowledge is created. Science, technology 
and society studies have taught us much about the 
social mechanisms by which knowledge is created 
(see Woolgar, 2000). 
In this body of research, knowledge is the out-
come of social processes and institutional guided 
actions of researchers. Funding agencies, users and 
audiences are implicitly involved in research pro-
jects. More explicitly, we can consider the impact of 
peer review procedures, the procedures for funding 
research projects, academic ‘rules of the game’ and 
paradigmatic routines. Important authors in this 
stream are Latour (1999), Knorr-Cetina (1999) and 
Bijker (2001). Science is not the objective procedure 
by which facts are uncovered, but the way of life in 
which facts are made. 
Table 1 shows the differences between the tradi-
tional and the sociological vision on the process of 
generating science (see Bijker, 2001). 
Table 1. A traditional and a sociological view on generating science
Standard view of science and technology Constructivist view of science and technology 
Clear distinctions between the political and the scientific/technical 
domain 
Both domains are intertwined; what is defined as a technical or as a 
political problem will depend on the particular context 
Difference between ‘real science’ and ‘trans-science’ All science is value-laden and may, depending on the context, have 
implications for regulation and policy; thus there is no fundamental 
difference between ‘real science’ and ‘trans-science’, ‘mandated 
science’ and ‘policy-relevant science’ 
Scientific knowledge is discovered by asking methodologically  
sound questions, which are answered unambiguously by Nature 
The stabilisation of scientific knowledge is a social process 
Societal issues can be reduced to the social responsibility of individ-
ual scientists and engineers 
Development of science and technology is a social process rather 
than a chain of individual decisions; political and ethical issues  
related to science therefore cannot be reduced to the question of 
social responsibility of scientists and technologists 
Technology develops linearly, for instance, 
conception → decision → operation 
Technology development cannot be conceptualised as a process with 
separate stages, let alone a linear one 
Clear distinction between technology’s development and its effects The social construction of technology is a process that also continues 
into what is commonly called the ‘diffusion stage’; the (social,  
economic, ecological, cultural, …) effects of technology are thus part 
of the construction process and typically have direct vice versa  
implications for technology’s shaping  
Clear distinction between technology development and control Technology does not have the context-independent status that is 
necessary to hope for a separation of its development and control; its 
social construction and the (political, democratic) control are part of 
the same process 
Clear distinction between technology stimulation and regulation Stimulation and regulation may be distinguishable goals, but need not 
necessarily be implemented separately 
Technology determines society, not the other way around Social shaping of technology and technical building of society are two 
sides of the same coin 
Social needs and social and environmental costs can be  
established unambiguously 
Needs and costs of various kinds are also socially constructed — 
depending on the context, they are different for different relevant 
social groups, varying with perspectives 
Source: Bijker (2001, page  13) 
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Worlds of science and policy-making 
In this article we assume that the production of 
knowledge is a social process, a social construc 
tion, whereby the world of policy-making and the 
world of research and science meet each other and 
work together in producing policy-relevant informa-
tion, which is the sort of knowledge produced  
especially to serve as input to the policy process (see 
Dunn, 1994). 
This is in flagrant opposition to the more tradi-
tional view of science–politics, in which they are 
interpreted as two clearly distinct communities 
(Caplan, 1979), or two totally different cultures 
(Snow, 1964). Wiltshire (2001) speaks of a dichot-
omy between research and policy. The timeframe of 
both, their language and mutual images, their notion 
of rationality, differ fundamentally. Stehr (1992) 
speaks of the notion of instrumentality, underlying 
the picture of two totally different worlds. The strict 
division between the two worlds is inspired by two 
considerations: 
• Cultural/empirical: there are two totally different 
cultural systems, two different ways of life; 
• Functional/normative: there has to be a clear  
distinction for safeguarding objective, neutral  
information. 
In these utilisation studies, we can find multiple ex-
planations for the under-utilisation of research in 
policy, in line with the two communities theory. 
Wiltshire (2001, page 627) gave a good example: 
“Scientists failed to comprehend that the most 
‘rational’ form of behaviour for a politician was 
to behave ‘irrationally’. If the prime end or goal 
of a politician is survival, then the ends/means 
relationship begins to look very different.” 
The process of creating basic or fundamental knowl-
edge has been studied extensively. The process of 
creating policy-relevant information or, in the terms 
of Hunt and Shackley (1999), “fiducial knowledge” 
(referring to knowledge produced for the practical 
purposes of the questioner of knowledge, see below) 
has, more recently, also been studied, but until now 
to a lesser extent (see Groenewegen, 2002; Woolgar, 
2000). 
Authors such as Jasanoff (1990), Gieryn (2002), 
and Hunt and Shackley (1999) stress the mutual in-
fluences of the worlds of science and politics that 
play a role in the creation of policy-relevant inform-
ation. We can argue that the social processes sur-
rounding the production of policy-relevant 
information are more in terms of quantity and of 
intensity than in the case of production of fundamen-
tal research, because knowledge is constructed in 
close contact, and sometimes even interactively 
with, end users. Policy-relevant research is often 
contract research. The social and institutional as-
pects in the process of creating policy-relevant in-
formation are very important in understanding the 
content and impact of knowledge. For example, the 
construction of the research question is of great  
importance for the outcomes of the research (in’t 
Veld and Verheij, 2000). 
Until recently, the dominant paradigm of knowl-
edge use in policy processes could be characterised 
as the injection-pump metaphor: knowledge insti-
tutes produced policy-relevant information, which is 
used, more or less, good or bad, instrumental or stra-
tegic, in policy processes. This metaphor is, at first 
sight, instructive but, when we look at the process  
of creating knowledge for policy, the metaphor is 
misleading. Science and politics are more and more 
interconnected and intermingling processes that  
cannot be studied as a one-to-one relationship. 
A convincing example of this intermingling is of-
fered by van der Sluijs et al (1998). They addressed 
the interesting question of how it can be explained 
that the climate sensitivity, the parameter (interval in 
degrees Celsius) representing the rise of temperature 
when CO2 in air is doubled, remains very stable over 
a long period, while the scientific uncertainties and 
diverging points of view were remarkable. In all the 
important reports about climate change, the same 
climate sensitivity interval is mentioned: when CO2 
in air doubles, temperature rises between 2.5 and 4.5 
degrees Celsius. This parameter functions as an an-
choring device for the scientific world and for pol-
icy-makers. It became a sign of credibility of 
scientific results and a hallmark for policy-makers 
that the information provided was a stable basis for 
policy decisions. 
Relationships between researchers and policy-makers 
The relationships between scientists and policy-
makers can be characterised in different ways. Hunt 
and Shackley (1999, page 147) distinguish three  
essential types of interrelationships: 
“1. Interaction: refers to a loose coupling. 
Coalitions [of policy-makers on the one 
hand and scientists on the other] co-exist 
We assume that the production of 
knowledge is a social process, whereby 
the world of policy-making and the 
world of research and science meet 
and work together in producing 
policy-relevant information, produced 
especially as input to the policy 
process 
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and exchange information, but retain clear 
boundaries and identities, have an inde-
pendent existence, and do not reshape 
each other. 
2. Integration: refers to a close fit, an inter-
mingling or interleaving. Boundary work 
reshapes each by the other. Mutually ac-
ceptable identities characterising the inte-
grated coalitions of research and practice 
begin to emerge. Agendas change in re-
sponse to the perceived needs of the other. 
Some sharing of tacit knowledge (or 
cross-recognition of the tacit components 
of the other) takes place. 
3. Hybridisation: occurs when the asso-
ciation produces something that is more 
than the sum of the parts, a ‘knowledge 
spiral’. Boundaries dissolve. … Mutual 
construction occurs.” 
An important explanatory variable for the level of 
integration is the sharing of tacit knowledge among 
the different domains: science, advice or policy  
participants. 
“A highly significant aspect of the association 
between science and policy is the extent to 
which the tacit elements of bureaucratic knowl-
edge co-exist and are recognised by, and 
across, different institutions. … Thus, it is the 
understanding of the needs of the policy realm, 
and the ways in which it operates, by scientists, 
alongside the recognition by the policy world 
of the form, functioning and limitations of sci-
ence, which leads to a closer relationship and 
the production of more effective knowledge.” 
(Hunt and Shackley, 1999, page 148) 
These authors focus on the fruitfulness of close rela-
tionships between policy-makers and researchers. 
The other aspect, cognitive and social closing as a 
consequence of tight relationships, can hinder pro-
gress and goal achievement in policy processes and 
can lead to bad and biased policy decisions (Janis, 
1972). We will elaborate further on this point. First, 
we present a short case study. Then we make some 
conclusions about the relationship between policy 
and science. Finally, we give some recommenda-
tions for preventing knowledge fights by means of 
forms of joint knowledge production. 
Case study: the Betuweline 
To make our point more clearly, we look in more 
detail at a case study — the Betuweline. We want to 
give some examples of distinct forms of knowledge 
production and the different relationships that exist 
between scientists and policy-makers. After describ-
ing this short case study, we propose an analytical 
framework for studying these phenomena. 
Introduction to the case 
The initiative for the construction of the Betuwe 
goods transport track (the Betuweline) was taken by 
Dutch Railways to realise a better connection to the 
hinterland (and Germany) from Mainport Rotter-
dam. Together with an influential Rotterdam port 
lobby and (at a later stage) the Ministry of Traffic 
and Waterways, it started a campaign to construct a 
railway that would have to be able to process  
millions of tonnes of freight. The railway lobby  
had no problems in generating knowledge to support 
this proposal. This investment would generate huge 
profits for NS Cargo (the freight department of 
Dutch Railways) and for the port of Rotterdam, 
would reduce road traffic and the pollution associ-
ated with it. 
However, when the Betuweline entered the plan-
ning stages, ‘counter-knowledge’ was produced 
from many sides. Some 140 reports and countless 
opinions and observations were published. Virtually 
every aspect of the policy proposal was the subject 
of debate. The level of emissions from freight trains 
proved to be high after all, certainly if diesel loco-
motives were used and if speeds were high. The 
standard measurement of noise pollution (based on 
models) appeared to deviate significantly from ac-
tual measurements. The extent to which road traffic 
would be reduced was said to be negligible. The lack 
of safety of the transport had been consistently un-
derestimated. 
In addition, many alternatives were presented: a 
drilled tunnel, a lowered tunnel, transport pipes for 
containers and (one of the most promoted and most 
elaborate alternatives) internal navigation. The ca-
pacity of the biggest container ship in internal navi-
gation, the Jowi, became proverbial in comparison 
with a goods train. Uncertainty about knowledge 
reached its peak in the discussion on the macroeco-
nomic impact of the Betuweline. Estimates varied  
by tens of billions of Euros (Bomhoff, 1995; CPB, 
1995). 
Typical of the use of knowledge surrounding  
the Betuweline was its strategic nature (Pestman, 
2001). In much of the research, the outcome was 
largely determined by the problem definition. In  
In the case of the Betuweline, several 
decisions were taken without the 
knowledge to justify them; and much 
research was open to several different 
interpretations, causing parties to 
arrive at different conclusions on the 
basis of the same figures 
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addition, several decisions were taken without  
the knowledge being available that was actually 
needed to justify them. Remarkably enough,  
commissioned research appeared to play a bigger 
role in policy considerations than does scientific re-
search. Much research appeared to be open to sev-
eral different interpretations, causing parties to 
arrive at different conclusions on the basis of the 
same figures. 
Scientists did not adhere to their role as ‘fact  
suppliers’. Researchers also played a major role in  
the policy offensive. Not infrequently they had  
their own political agenda (as did the civil engineers 
who advocated underground construction (Boom  
and Metze, 1997). Sometimes, knowledge prod 
ucers were dependent on data that could only be sup-
plied by interested parties (Pestman, 2001, pages 
198–200). 
This ‘knowledge fight’ generated virtually no ex-
changes of knowledge, let alone shared knowledge. 
The Ministry and Dutch Railways ditched many al-
ternative proposals as being unrealistic, unafford-
able, unfeasible and undesirable. This case does 
show, however, that the Ministry and Dutch Rail-
ways no longer hold the knowledge monopoly in 
railway infrastructure. Many other actors were able 
to produce and deploy serious knowledge on this 
subject. 
The report by the Hermans Committee put an end 
to the discussion — not because it answered all the 
questions, but because the political leadership com-
mitted itself to the report — and the Betuweline was 
approved. The work of the Committee was criticised 
because the internal navigation alternative had been 
insufficiently investigated (Roscam Abbing, 1999). 
Also, the report included overly optimistic conclu-
sions on the environmental impact (see the letter 
from the Sustainable Mobility Foundation [Stichting 
Duurzame Mobiliteit] (1999) to the Dutch House of 
Commons). 
So the discussion about the knowledge produced 
certainly did continue, but it no longer had any reper-
cussions on the outcome of the political debate and 
the final decision. For a while, it looked as though this 
would be the case; uncertainty about the profitability 
of the project had meanwhile risen to such an extent 
that the halting of construction threatened to become a 
real issue at the recent parliamentary elections. How-
ever, this threat was averted as well. 
Three actor groups 
We can distinguish at least three more or less  
stable groups of actors in the policy process for  
the Betuweline, formed around concrete policy 
themes. Within these groups, different coalitions of 
actors mobilise their own policy-relevant informa-
tion to influence or determine policy decisions.  
The three most important actor groups in the are 
(Pestman, 2001; Frissen, 2000; Boom and Metze, 
1997): 
• the Mainport coalition: the Department of Trans-
port, the Dutch Railways, a couple of advising of-
fices, the coalition parties in Parliament; 
• the inland shipping coalition: organisations of 
bargemen, the Socialist Party, the Sustainable 
Mobility Foundation, the committee “Let the 
Betuweline sail”, and others; 
• the environment coalition: local and regional au-
thorities, the Nature and Environment Foundation, 
and others. 
Within these groups, concentrating on concrete 
themes, there were often at least two distinct re-
search coalitions composed of actors from the policy 
world (policy-makers, other participants in the pol-
icy process) and the research world (consultants, 
researchers, advisors) that helped in the struggle for 
a specific goal by generating and providing research 
information. There are multiple examples of these 
conflicting coalitions in the case. We will look more 
closely at two examples. The first is about the re-
search on inland shipping as an alternative for trans-
portation by rail. The second deals with the 
investigation on how serious the noise pollution of 
rail transportation is. 
Inland shipping: a serious alternative? 
With respect to inland shipping as an alternative to 
rail transportation, two coalitions can be distin-
guished (see Figure 1). The first arena was consti-
tuted by the organisation of the bargemen, a private 
foundation called the Sustainable Mobility Founda-
tion and technicians from the University of Delft. 
This arena tried to promote inland shipping as a se-
rious alternative for the Betuweline. The central 
Government, the Cabinet and the coalition parties in 
Parliament, and the advisers of Knight Wendling (a 
consulting agency) formed the second arena. They 
opposed the inland shipping alternative. 
This latter coalition produced a report, written by 
the consultants to Knight Wendling, which presented 
a very optimistic view of the possible economic 
rents of the Betuweline, based on a very positive sce-
nario for economic growth in Europe (Roscam Ab-
bing, 1999; Boom and Metze, 1997). The alternative 
Mainport 
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Inland 
shipping arena 
Sustainable
Mobility 
Foundation
Cabinet 
Technical
University 
of Delft 
Knight 
Wendling, 
Central 
Coalition 
Dutch 
Association of 
Bargemen 
Figure 1. Knowledge arenas around alternative options 
for the Betuweline 
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option of inland shipping was not considered seri-
ously in this study. Later on, the study was attacked 
for not being independently commissioned. 
The Ministry of Transport had asked for a report 
about the shifts that would occur in the macroeco-
nomic and societal costs and returns, if the construc-
tion of the Betuweline was not carried out (Roscam 
Abbing, 1999, page 65). The harm done by not 
building the Betuweline was taken as the point of 
departure for this study and the report sketched a 
real doomsday scenario for the port of Rotterdam. 
Alternative options were not taken into account. 
The other arena also produced knowledge; this 
strongly favoured inland shipping as an alternative 
to the Betuweline. The Minister of Transport could 
ignore this information, because of the effective 
backing by the coalition parties in Parliament. As a 
consequence, transport by inland shipping rather 
than rail did not play an important role in the policy 
process. In the final advice of the Hermans Commit-
tee, the inland shipping option was not studied seri-
ously at all. 
How serious is the noise pollution? 
The second example of knowledge fights is conflict-
ing knowledge about the noise generated by the new 
railway. When the subject of noise pollution became 
an issue, two other coalitions were formed (see  
Figure 2). A private actor (who had a commercial 
interest in drilling railway tunnels!) and the regional 
government of the Province of Gelderland asked a 
private research institute to calculate the possible 
sound pollution of the Betuweline. The results were 
disturbing and did not correspond with those given 
by the environmental impact assessment (EIA), ini-
tiated by the Dutch Railways and the Ministry of 
Transport. The EIA is obligatory and is incorporated 
in the policy process. 
A few months later, the Sustainable Mobility 
Foundation presented a report from the Bureau Ule-
hake (see Figure 3). In this, the noise pollution cal-
culated by the EIA was questioned. The bureau gave 
totally different research results. Later on, Ulehake 
published a report, commissioned by local authori-
ties, wherein the formal figure methods for noise 
pollution where compared with actual measure-
ments. However, these research results played a  
minor part in the political assessment process. There 
was not enough political support for taking measures 
to prevent noise pollution. 
The EIA ‘won’ both knowledge fights, because of 
the dominant status of the EIA in the political deci-
sion-making process of the Netherlands. The EIA 
fitted effectively with the ideas, values and interests 
articulated in the policy process. The way it was 
conducted was an effective sharing of mutual tacit 
knowledge, which was integrated in the research 
design (ten Heuvelhof and Nauta, 1996). The EIA 
fits well in traditional policy processes around in-
vestments in infrastructure. The assessment proce-
dure fits well in classical forms of policy-making 
with one dominant, central policy-maker, but not in 
a more participatory policy processes in which 
knowledge is produced collaboratively (see also 
Deelstra et al, 2003). 
Conclusion 
In the case of the Betuweline, we see that actors 
from both the academic and the policy domain 
gravitate towards each other and form a coalition to 
produce information in order to defend a particular 
point of view. We used the concept of coalition to 
define the explicit and implicit structures of a social 
process, in which different actors work closely to-
gether to produce policy-relevant information. In 
complex policy processes around infrastructural pro-
jects (such as the Betuweline), there are multiple 
conflicting research coalitions in action at the same 
time. Actors involved in the policy process want to 
mobilise their own ‘scientific’ arguments to defend 
their goals in the policy process. 
Sometimes, there can be very clear boundaries in 
a knowledge coalition. The researchers want to de-
fend their objectivity and neutrality and the policy-
makers do not try to influence the research process. 
This does not imply that mutual influences do not 
exist. Social influences are always, to some extent, 
present. 
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The knowledge production problem revisited 
The main problem, when we look at the utilisation 
of knowledge in policy, is not so much (as supposed 
by traditional utilisation studies) the communication 
and understanding problems within a research coali-
tion (see Figure 4), but more the communication and 
knowledge stream between coalitions (see Figure 5). 
The case of the Betuweline has shown us how 
knowledge is generated in parallel and by separate 
operating knowledge coalitions; it is then strategi-
cally used in the direction of other knowledge coali-
tions. Knowledge is produced in close interaction 
between producers and potential users. In complex 
decision-making situations this phenomenon leads  
to a large number of distinct coalitions in which dif-
ferent knowledge is created. This can result in 
‘knowledge fights’. 
Knowledge is produced from a single organisa-
tional perspective; actors who hold a different view 
on the issue will find this perspective non-
authoritative and therefore the generated knowledge 
non-authoritative. The other parties will then counter 
with knowledge delivered from their own perspec-
tive. This is the genesis of ‘knowledge fights’, in 
which actors fire from one trench (or perspective) at 
the other. In projects, the use of knowledge appears 
to be aimed mainly at convincing the opposition and 
substantiating one’s own perspectives. The resulting 
communication pattern can be characterised as a 
“dialogue of the deaf” (van Eeten, 1999). 
The classic distinction between the two worlds — 
of knowledge and of policy-making (Figure 5) — is 
questioned in this article. Sociological analysis of 
knowledge-generating processes does not leave 
room for such a clear-cut distinction between poli-
tics and science, although we do not want to go so 
far as to say that the problems of knowledge use are 
not present in these coalitions. There is a problem in 
sharing cultural characteristics between the different 
worlds of politics and science (see Watkins, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the problem of knowledge coalitions 
that exist in parallel and operate in isolation is more 
important, but often not recognised. 
Thus we can conclude from our short case study 
that knowledge is often produced in separate coali-
tions in which different researchers, policy-makers 
and stakeholders work closely together in producing 
knowledge. This separation enables several forms of 
logic and paradigms to exist side-by-side. This, in 
turn, is one of the main reasons why knowledge 
fights exist. Several constellations of knowledge 
institutes and users exist side-by-side. 
The consequence is that, while knowledge is ac-
cepted within the coalition because knowledge pro-
ducers and consumers have developed a workable 
relationship and logic, that same knowledge is not 
seen as credible in a different constellation of 
knowledge institutes and users; because the knowl-
edge supplied does not correspond to the paradigm 
and the institutional context prevailing in this  
constellation, it is contested and rejected. 
This point fits closely with that made by Sabatier 
(1988; 1993). In a policy discussion, we can find dif-
ferent, tightly integrated actor coalitions — Sabatier 
calls them “advocacy coalitions” or “belief subsys-
tems” — which hold conflicting policy arguments. 
Not only policy actors can be distinguished in differ-
ent coalitions, but also knowledge providers that 
choose their own position in the coalition. 
Within the actor coalitions that can be distin-
guished using the framework of Sabatier, we see 
different policy–knowledge circuits, normally con-
sisting of two or three actors, one or two from the 
policy world (interest group, local government, po-
litical party) and one from the research world (ad-
vice bureau, scientist, consultant), willing to answer 
their specific research question within the specific 
conditions set by the policy actor. We focus (more 
than Sabatier does) on the role of the knowledge 
providers in the advocacy coalition in this article and 
on how they fuel the fights among the different  
advocacy coalitions. 
The knowledge providers deliver their clients the 
relevant facts, which can serve as ammunition in the 
policy discussion. Within such a circuit, ready-made 
policy-relevant knowledge is generated for the  
different clienteles. This process is stimulated by 
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autonomous developments within the world of 
knowledge and research (Nowotny et al, 2002). 
Different knowledge coalitions develop in which 
different actors (policy-makers, researchers, and so 
on) have a certain relationship with each other. In 
some cases, the relationship is stabilised for a longer 
time; in other words it has become institutionalised. 
We refer here to the distinction of Hunt and Shack-
ley (1999) among interaction, integration and hy-
bridisation as levels of intermingling between 
researchers and policy-makers (or other participants 
in the policy process). 
Each knowledge coalition has constructed its own 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘roles in the game’, which 
lead to certain relationships (March and Olson, 
1989). Further research for these rules and roles has 
to be conducted in order to understand the specific 
relationships within a specific knowledge coalition 
and among separate knowledge coalitions (see Hor-
lick-Jones and de Marchi, 1995; Krueck and 
Borchers, 1999; Miller, 2001). There is also to some 
extent a shared language within these knowledge – 
policy circuits (see van den Boogerd, 2002). 
Tight and institutionalised relationships within 
knowledge coalitions lead (among other things) to 
the absence of inter-coalition communication. In the 
Betuweline case, we see time and time again situa-
tions in which conflicting research coalitions do not 
listen to each other’s opinions and statements. For 
example, supporters of the inland shipping alterna-
tive felt themselves not taken seriously by policy-
makers. The information generated by this coalition 
was not sufficiently taken into account in the report 
of the Hermans Committee, underlying the formal 
governmental ‘go’ decision for the construction of 
the Betuweline (Roscam Abbing, 1999). 
The main problem concerning knowledge produc-
tion and use concerns the use of knowledge in coali-
tions other than the one in which it is generated. In 
the last section we give some recommendations for 
the organisation of the knowledge-finding process 
around controversial policy processes, to prevent 
‘fact-fighting scenes’. 
Concluding: boundary management 
We have argued, both theoretically and empirically, 
that today’s knowledge production in complex 
multi-actor settings (for example, for infrastructural 
and environmental issues) takes place in separate 
and closed actor coalitions that declare war on each 
other. A knowledge management strategy is needed 
to prevent these ‘knowledge battles’. A department 
cannot propose a policy option, and defend it with 
data from its own research office without political 
and societal discussion about the policy problem, the 
proposed solution and the data used. In nearly all 
policy processes nowadays, the facts are the subject 
of discussion, and contra-evidence is provided from 
many sides. 
The main challenge is to establish links among 
different knowledge production coalitions in order to 
prevent ‘knowledge battles’. There are many solu-
tions offered in literature. Joint fact-finding (Ehr-
mann and Stinson, 1999), participatory policy 
analysis, collaborative dialogues (Innes and Booher, 
1999), collaborative analysis (Busenberg, 1999), 
‘interactive social science’ (Caswill and Shove, 
2000) and so on. 
All these solutions try to make connections be-
tween separated knowledge coalitions. These links 
should enable knowledge to have an impact in other 
coalitions and networks and ultimately in policy-
making. Meaningful knowledge can only be created 
on the basis of a process of joint knowledge produc-
tion. In this process, separate coalitions of scientists 
and policy-makers and other stakeholders with  
differing viewpoints and interests work together to 
develop data and information, analyse facts and 
forecasts, develop common assumptions and in-
formed opinions, and, finally, use the information 
they have developed to reach decisions together. 
They develop and implement a research strategy and 
approach in mutual interaction, to answer questions 
on knowledge. 
The organisation of links among separate knowl-
edge coalitions can be labelled ‘boundary manage-
ment’ (compare Guston, 1996; 1998). We are aware 
that we use this term in a different way from Guston. 
Since we see the main problem being the existence of 
different and conflicting knowledge coalitions at the 
same time, we state that boundary management has to 
concentrate more on the interaction among different 
knowledge coalitions. We abandon the idea that it has 
to concentrate only on the facilitation of the interac-
tion between the world of science and the world of 
policy-making within a knowledge coalition. 
Boundary management is about the concentration 
on the spanning of multiple knowledge coalitions 
and the integration of research and decision-making 
in the early stage of a knowledge-production pro-
cess. It tries to restructure the relationships among 
different knowledge networks as an interactive, two-
way and adaptive process. 
The interrelation of different knowledge coali-
tions can be organised and managed in different 
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complex multi-actor settings  takes 
place in separate and closed actor 
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other: a knowledge management 
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ways. First in terms of interaction (Hunt and Shack-
ley, 1999), linking mechanisms have to be designed 
among the different knowledge coalitions. At certain 
moments, actors of these coalitions meet to co-
ordinate researchers, clarify interests and try to find 
common ground for the production of knowledge. 
Second, in terms of integration and hybridisation 
(Hunt and Shackley, 1999), a totally new knowledge 
coalition is formed in which different actors of dif-
ferent knowledge coalitions participate and in which 
the research agenda and the research process are  
designed co-operatively. First, there will be a discus-
sion on the research agenda, on which topics needs 
to be addressed and what questions are to be an-
swered through research. Second, actors search in 
mutual interaction for workable methods in the quest 
for knowledge and the guiding principles, assump-
tions and suppositions on which these methods are 
based. 
Also, the (fundamental, temporal and geographi-
cal) system boundaries and the scope of the study 
(for instance, when will it begin? when will it be 
concluded? which effects will be included? on the 
basis of which criteria will these effects be evalu-
ated? which subjects will be part of the study, and 
which will not?) must be ratified by mutual agree-
ment. In short, the research agenda and the research 
design are the outcome of a process of discussion 
and negotiation between stakeholders and external 
experts rather than something that has been given in 
advance. 
In case the stakeholders are unable to decide 
which methods should be used, they may decide to 
use several (competing) methods and/or sensitivity 
analyses to analyse to what extent the outcomes will 
vary for the different assumptions on which the 
various methods are based. They may also decide to 
integrate various research models. Finally, they may 
decide to set up a ‘Committee of Wise Men’ com-
posed of independent experts from various disci-
plines, charged with the task of settling persistent 
knowledge conflicts. 
Third, the results of the knowledge-production 
process can always be subjected to an “extended 
peer review” (Ravetz, 1999) in which the results are 
tested by interested parties, scientists, experts and 
decision-makers together. Needless to say, a purely 
scientific arsenal of testing criteria is not sufficient 
here. It is precisely the multiplicity of criteria by 
which the results are tested that will give this review 
its added value. 
This kind of boundary management can lead to 
salient and credible knowledge production. It can 
lead to saliency of the knowledge, because different 
stakeholders participate and have the opportunity to 
express their knowledge needs. It also can lead to 
credibility of the knowledge, because stakeholders 
can contribute to the design of the research that ul-
timate leads to authoritative knowledge production. 
However, there still remain different interests. A 
simple plea for co-operation and collaboration is not 
sufficient to resolve enduring knowledge battles.  
A new way of knowledge production requires a  
new way of policy-making. Governance strategies 
have to start with an open problem definition and an 
open policy agenda in order to reach collective 
agreement about policy options and the underlying 
argumentation. 
Joint fact-finding in a situation in which the policy 
problem is already fixed cannot prevent disagreement 
about the arguments that will be used to defend the 
policy proposal. After all, disagreement is a funda-
mental characteristic of our society. The challenge is 
to make the disagreements productive. We have tried 
to give some ways for bridging the gap between dif-
ferent knowledge generating coalitions. 
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